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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
VICARIOUS REINFORCEMENT IS A RESULT OF EARLIER LEARNING
by
Maricel Cigales
Florida International University, 1995
Professor Jacob L. Gewirtz, Major Professor
The term "vicarious reinforcement" has been used by social-
learning theorists to denote imitation that results from the
observed reinforcement of behavior performed by a model.
This conceptualization is incompatible with that of behavior
analysis because it ignores the effect of prior learning on
the observer's behavior and violates the definition of
reinforcement. Experiment 1 replicated prior findings.
Preschool children (N=32) imitated a model's reinforced
choice responses, in the absence of direct experience with
contingencies. In Experiment 2 (N=48), subjects failed to
imitate reinforced modeled behavior when observed behavior
contingencies were 'incongruent' with those experienced. The
results were interpreted as consistent with the behavior-
analytic position that observed reinforcement of a model's
behavior functions as a discriminative cue (SD), not
reinforcement, for the observer's imitative responses.
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Chapter I
Introduction
"Vicarious" conceptualizations of behavioral phenomena
were proposed by Bandura (1965, 1969) to account for changes
in the behavior of an observer as the result of witnessing a
model's behavior and its consequences. Vicarious-
reinforcement and it variants have been the focus of a large
body of research over the past 35 years, most of which has
been generated by Bandura's social-learning theory. However,
the vicarious-reinforcement conception is incompatible with
behavior analysis and the operant-learning literature which
have advanced conditioning processes to explain overt and
covert behavior. This paper argues that traditional operant-
conditioning processes can account for many, if not all,
behavioral phenomena that have been classified as resulting
from vicarious reinforcement.
Chapter 2 begins by defining the term "vicarious" as it
has been used in the relevant literature. Imitation is then
discussed as the basis of several vicarious phenomena.
Finally, the numerous and often-overlapping concepts that
may by found under the rubric or "vicarious" are then
defined and the behavioral phenomena to which they apply are
delineated. Behavior-analytic conceptualizations are
proposed for each concept.
Chapter 3 focuses specifically on the vicarious
reinforcement literature. Empirical evidence that has been
interpreted as support for the concept of vicarious
reinforcement is presented, as well as disconfirming
research findings. Finally, an operant-learning based re-
conceptualization of vicarious reinforcement phenomena is
proposed.
Chapter 4 presents the results of two empirical studies
that tested the above-mentioned re-conceptualization of
vicarious reinforcement. Finally, Chapter 5 integrates the
current findings with previous literature and provides a
behavior-analytic interpretation of the results.
2
Chapter II
Vicarious and Related Processes
Over the past 50 years researchers have proposed
numerous "vicarious" concepts to explain behavior. For
example, Bandura's social-learning theory includes the terms
"vicarious reinforcement", "vicarious punishment",
"vicarious extinction", "vicarious arousal", "implicit
reward", "vicarious classical conditioning", and
"observational learning" (Bandura, 1969, 1971, 1977). Other
associated terms are "vicarious instigation",
identification, "vicarious learning", imitation, modeling,
social facilitation, local enhancement and imitative
learning (Bandura, 1971; Berger, 1962; Dubner, 1973;
Gewirtz, 1971b; Green & Osborne, 1985; Hinde, 1970;
Sharpley, 1985; Thelen & Rennie, 1972; Thorpe, 1963).
Most of these concepts are founded on cognitive
interpretations of overt behaviors. There is much
imprecision in the application of such terms, many of which
are used interchangeably in the literature (e.g., Bandura,
1965a). Additionally, there is often overlap in concepts
such as observational learning, vicarious reinforcement, and
imitation in terms of the behavioral phenomena they describe
(Browder, Schoen & Lentz, 1986; Green & Osborne, 1985;
Hinde, 1970). The outcome of this has been a tangled
research and conceptual literature in which the exact
3
meanings of terms vary depending on the setting in which the
phenomenon occurs, the stimuli associated with the
phenomenon, the types of behaviors involved and the
theoretical position of the author.
Such ambiguity may diffuse researchers' ability to
explain efficiently and consensually processes underlying
the myriad behavioral phenomena considered by some to be
"vicarious," and may permit some to conclude that there has
been explanation when only the appearance of explanation has
been presented. At a minimum, this ambiguity can impede
clear discussion both within and across theoretical lines
about these phenomena. In the absence of a common language
about so-called vicarious events, the operational
definitions of such phenomena should clearly denote the
stimulus conditions and processes necessary for their
differential classification. These measures should lead to
stricter and more precise use of terms. More importantly,
the need for labels that include the term "vicarious" should
be carefully evaluated. As will be discussed in subsequent
chapters, many so-called vicarious events can be accounted
for straightforwardly by operant-conditioning processes,
making the 'vicarious' notion, and thereby the label,
unnecessary.
In an effort to disentangle some of the many concepts
that fall under the rubric of "vicarious," this chapter will
4
define several vicarious terms, highlight areas of overlap
and delineate the phenomena to which they apply. In the case
of "vicarious reinforcement," the term "vicarious" has
served to modify the term "reinforcement" which has been the
term representing the central engine of behavior change in
the behavior-analytic theory. Thus, a behavior-analytic
interpretation of these phenomena will be presented as the
preferred approach to the theoretical and empirical
investigation of "vicarious" events.
What is Vicarious?
De Charms and Rosenbaum (1960) specified three criteria
for classifying phenomenon as vicarious: 1) an individual
observes a response by a model, 2) the observer does not
respond to the same environmental stimuli to which the model
responded, and 3) the observed consequence to the response
of the model functions on the observer's behavior "as if" it
were the observer who had responded. It is this third
criterion that is the most nebulous. De Charms and
Rosenbaum suggested no objective means of determining as-
ifness. Many behavioral phenomena that result from operant
learning may appear "as if" they were due to vicarious
stimulus conditions. Furthermore, the authors' "as if"
criterion does not consider the functional relations that
may exist between the observer's responses and environmental
events of the past or present.
Nevertheless, "as if" conceptualizations of vicarious
phenomena continue to characterize social-learning theory.
Thus, researchers functioning under these conceptualizations
(e.g. Bandura, 1965a) consistently have neglected the role
of functional stimulus-response-contingency relations, and
other operant processes, in accounting for behavior that
appears "as if" it were vicariously reinforced. The central
postulate of the present analysis is that a behavior-
analytic approach can provide a more parsimonious
explanatory account of most, if not all, vicarious
phenomena.
Imitation
Although imitation is not itself a vicarious event, most
vicarious processes require matching of a model's behavior,
which is commonly termed imitation. Indeed, imitative (i.e.,
matching) responses routinely are the dependent variables in
studies of vicarious phenomena. Without the individual's
imitative responses it would be impossible to speak of
vicarious phenomena that involve the production of behavior,
such as vicarious reinforcement and observational learning.
Thus, the concept of imitation is an appropriate point of
departure for this discussion.
Imitation has been regarded as an important component of
cognitive development (Guillaume, 1926/76; Piaget, 1962;
Wishart, 1986), language development (Gewirtz, 1969;
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Kymissis & Poulson, 1990; Piaget, 1962; Poulson, Nunes &
Warren, 1989; Meltzoff, 1988) and social development
(Gewirtz, 1969, 1991; Meltzoff, 1988, Poulson, Nunes &
Warren 1989; Wishart, 1986). Imitation also has played a key
role in phenomena listed under the headings of
identification (Gewirtz, 1991; Gewirtz & Stingle, 1968) and
moral development (Gewirtz & Pelaez-Nogueras, 1991). Thus,
imitation appears to be fundamental to development.
However, there has been much debate over the nature of
imitation. Early theories of imitation include Thorndike's
instinctive imitation, Humphery's classical conditioning,
and Hull's drive theory of imitation (see Kymissis &
Poulson, 1990, for a complete review). While theorists
recognized environmental influences, the predominant
conceptualizations of imitation at the turn of the century
emphasized biologically-based mechanisms.
Miller and Dollard (1941) were the first to propose that
imitative behaviors are learned and maintained by
reinforcement. Although Guillaume (1926/76) had previously
discussed 'learning to imitate', he viewed imitation as
mediated by innate mental processes rather than
environmental contingencies. Miller and Dollard's theory
posits imitation as a learned drive. This notion was later
echoed by Thorpe (1963, pg. 135) who defined imitation as
... the copying of a novel or otherwise improbable act or
7
utterance or some act for which there is clearly no
instinctive tendency. " Such conceptualizations signaled a
move away from nativistic and toward learning-based views of
imitation. While there is yet no consensus on the nature of
imitation, most contemporary theorists and researchers agree
that imitative behavior is a result of and is
topographically similar to the observed behavior of another
(Gewirtz & Stingle, 1968; Thelen & Rennie, 1972; Uzgiris,
1984).
Miller and Dollard (1941) distinguished between matched-
dependent imitation and copying. In both cases imitative
responses are maintained by reinforcement. In the case of
matched-dependent imitation, the observer's behavior is cued
by the model's behavior because either the observer does not
have access to the environmental stimuli controlling the
model's behavior, or the observer is not able to
discriminate these stimuli. For example, Anne and Julia are
sitting at a bus stop. After several buses pass Anne stands
and approaches the curb, Julia then imitates this behavior.
Two scenarios are possible. Julia (the imitator) may not
Thorpe's definition of imitation has been misinterpreted
to mean that only instances of novel behaviors are evidence
of "true imitation" (Hinde, 1970, pg 583; Wyrwicka, 1988).
However, Thorpe (1963) defined imitation in the context of
distinguishing it from social facilitation (a distinction that
will be discussed below). Thorpe's definition clearly allows
for imitation of responses already in the imitator's
repertoire.
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have seen the bus, or may not have discriminated it as the
awaited bus. Regardless, the imitated response would have
been reinforced by boarding the long-awaited bus. 2 Future
imitation of responses made by the model, in similar
contexts, would therefore be more likely.
Miller and Dollard's paradigm for matched-dependent
imitation provides the basis for a behavior-analytic
explanation of generalized imitation and the related concept
of identification. These two concepts are discussed below.
At this point, however, it is important to note the function
of reinforcement in the establishment and maintenance of
imitative responses. It will be argued below that
environmental contingencies, as proposed by Miller and
Dollard (1941), can account for imitation and its related
vicarious phenomena.
Copying is also a type of imitation. Thorpe (1963) used
the term copying as a discrete action verb. However, for
Miller and Dollard, copying is a process roughly equivalent
to the contemporary behavior analytic concept of shaping.
Like matched-dependent imitation, copying requires
reinforcement of imitative responses, in this case responses
that are increasingly more similar topographically to the
2 Miller and Dollard used the term "reward" rather than
reinforcement. However, in this case, their reward concept is
functionally identical to the behavior-analytic term
"reinforcement."
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modeled response. The process may be directed by an agent
who determines the "sameness" of the copier's response to
that of the model's and delivers the reinforcers
accordingly. However, the copier may also carry out the
process and provide self-reinforcement. Here, as in matched-
dependent imitation, the copier must respond to cues from
the behavior of a model, but must additionally judge the
"sameness" of his/her response to that of the model. That
is, the copier must respond to cues of "sameness" produced
by his/her actions in assessing how precisely he/she has
matched the modeled behavior. For example, when attempting
to improve language pronunciation using audio cassette
instruction, a student may repeat an exercise several times.
In doing so, the student responds to the verbal cues
provided by the recorded model and to the sound of his/her
own pronunciation. In this way the student uses information
about how closely his/her pronunciation approximates that of
the model's to regulate his/her practice.
Two distinctions can be drawn between shaping and
copying. First, copying emphasizes the reinforcing agency's
ability to respond to "sameness" cues. In shaping, the
discrimination of 'sameness' is assumed and the emphasis is
instead on the reinforcement of successive approximations to
the target (in this case the model's) behavior. Second,
copying requires a modeled behavior, while shaping may occur
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without the benefit of modeling.
Gewirtz (1969; Gewirtz & Stingle, 1968) suggested that
imitation may be an outcome of shaping with reinforcement.
Gewirtz argued that imitation is merely an operant response
that, like all others, is maintained by environmental
contingencies. Other operant-learning accounts of imitation
have been proposed. Skinner (1953, pg. 120) described
imitation as an operant response that is brought about by
"discriminative reinforcement" contingencies. Any imitative
response, according to Skinner, is part of a three-term
contingency. Under this conceptualization, a modeled
response functions as the discriminative event that
occasions the imitative response, which is in turn
maintained by reinforcement. From a behavior-analytic
standpoint, either process, shaping or discriminative
control and reinforcement, can account for the acquisition
and maintenance of imitative behaviors. In short, imitation
may be acquired and maintained by any of the same
conditioning processes that control other operants.
Nevertheless, imitation is typically accorded special
status by non-conditioning theorists. Non-conditioning
explanations of imitation have been popular and extensively
investigated. One reason for this may be that researchers
have found it difficult, if not impossible, to account for
operant-learning processes in natural settings. Processes
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such as shaping may occur very gradually over extended
periods of time and reinforcement contingencies may not be
apparent. One of the theses of this paper is that the same
may be true of a variety of behavioral phenomena discussed
below. These phenomena are considered vicarious by some,
accompanied by little or no effort to identify controlling
environmental stimuli that may be operating.
Identification and Generalized Imitation
The concept of identification arises from Freud's (1920,
1933) personality theory and overlaps that of imitation
(Bandura, 1969; Gewirtz & Stingle, 1968). Identification has
been indicated when the imitator matches, not necessarily
specific responses of the model, but rather a general
pattern of behaviors that is characteristic of that model.
This includes behavior denoting the model's values, beliefs,
role and ideals (Bandura & Houston, 1961; Gewirtz & Stingle,
1968). The object of identification is most commonly someone
of high status for the imitator, such as parents (Bandura &
Houston, 1961; Miller & Dollard, 1941). Identification has
sometimes been conceptualized to involve various cognitive
processes such as the intrinsic reinforcement value of
likeness to the model (Kohlberg, 1963) or the formation of
internal symbolic representations (Emmerich, 1959),
Bandura (1969) has suggested that identification
phenomena can be accounted for by the process of incidental
12
learning. Incidental learning refers to learning that
occurs in the absence of direct tuition or contingencies
(Catania, 1992, pg. 378). This level of explanation
eliminates the need for superfluous cognitive concepts.
However, the descriptive incidental learning notion fails to
explain how non-reinforced behaviors may enter the
individual's repertoire.
The concept of 'imitativeness' proposed by Miller and
Dollard (1941) is useful in addressing this question.
According to the Miller and Dollard four-factor theory of
learning, repeated reinforcement of imitative behaviors
results in the development of an 'imitativeness drive'. The
concept of imitativeness moves in the direction of a more
parsimonious, process explanation of identification because
it does not include assumptions about cognitive processes
that may be involved.
In general, imitativeness is consistent with behavior-
analytic theory, except for the notion of an underlying
imitative 'drive', which is gratuitous for behavior
analysis. However, the process by which 'imitativeness'
develops appears to be the same process as that involved in
the formation of generalized imitation. Thus, in this case,
the imitativeness 'drive' conception can be reconciled with
behavior analysis.
From this perspective, imitative behaviors may come to
13
function as a generalized matching-response class, not
unlike other response classes (Baer & Deguchi, 1985;
Gewirtz, 1969, 1971b; Gewirtz & Stingle, 1968; Kymissis &
Poulson, 1990). The first instance of imitation may occur by
chance or is brought about via processes such as shaping or
fading (Gewirtz & Stingle, 1968). Early occurrences of
imitation are then maintained by reinforcement
contingencies. Several imitative responses may be
established in this manner. Imitative responses that are
functionally equivalent (i.e., result in the same
consequence) come to function as a generalized response
class. Thus, new imitative responses need only to be
sufficiently similar to established responses in content,
context, function or topography in order to be added to the
response class (Baer & Deguchi, 1985; Gewirtz, 1969, 1971b;
Poulson, Nunes & Warren, 1989). Likewise, not all imitative
responses need to be individually reinforced. As long as
some members of the matching-response class are reinforced
intermittently, all of the responses in that class will be
maintained.
For example, Poulson and Kymissis (1988) taught 10-
month-old infants to imitate their mothers' manipulations of
various toys. The mothers modeled 15 topographically
distinct actions each involving a different toy. Imitation
of 10 responses were reinforced with verbal praise; five
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probe responses were not reinforced. The results showed that
the infants' imitation of non-reinforced responses increased
concurrently with reinforced responses. Such generalized
imitation effects have been reported by researchers who have
used a variety of tasks, reinforcers and models (Baer,
Peterson & Sherman, 1967; Baer & Sherman, 1964; Peterson &
Whitehurst, 1971; Waxler & Yarrow, 1970).
The proposed behavior-analytic interpretation maintains
that phenomena typically considered to denote identification
are merely cases of generalized imitation. Matching broad
patterns of behavior of a particular model may operate as a
functional response class for the imitator's behavior in the
manner described above. The imitator would then seem to
'identify' with the model.
Social Facilitation. Response Facilitation and Local
Enhancement
Social facilitation generally refers to instances in
which the performance of an instinctive behavior (also
referred to as a fixed-action pattern) by one member of the
species releases the same behavior in another (Catania,
1992; Thorpe, 1963). For example, when one bird takes flight
this action releases the same behavior in most members of
the flock. Thorpe refers to this as "contagious" behavior
(1963, pg. 133). While such events may appear to be
instances of imitation, they are generally regarded as
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attributable to innate mechanisms, rather than to learning
processes. Therefore, these behaviors should not be
considered to be vicarious.
The term social facilitation has been used differently
in the social psychology literature. There, social
facilitation is used to refer to the facilitative or
enhancing effects on the behavior of another of the mere
presence of an individual (e.g., Sanders, 1981). Again, no
imitation is involved in such cases. Therefore, the
vicarious notion should not be invoked.
However, Bandura (1977) has used the term social
facilitation in yet a third manner. He defined social
facilitation (which term Bandura has used interchangeably
with "response facilitation") for contexts in which, "...the
actions of others serve as social cues for eliciting
preexisting behavior (pg. 49)." Bandura, however, does not
limit these phenomena to instinctive behaviors. This usage
is illustrative of the pervasive problem of overlapping
concepts and loose terminology found within the literature
on social behavior. The term social facilitation is used to
denote three different processes. At the same time, two
different labels, social facilitation and response
facilitation, are used for potentially the same behavioral
phenomena. Also problematic is Bandura's use of the words
"cue" and "elicit." From a behavior-analytic perspective,
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"cue" and "elicit" denote different processes that cannot be
mixed in the manner suggested by the above definition. A
"cue" is a discriminative stimulus that occasions an operant
response. The term "elicit" refers to a respondent relation
between a stimulus and a response (Michael, 1993). Thus, a
cue does not elicit a response, but evokes or occasions it.
This example highlights the need for a common language among
theorists and researchers of behavior, including those who
are not identified with behavior analysis.
Local enhancement phenomena may also be mistaken for
imitation. In the case of local enhancement, there is an
increase in the likelihood that an individual will respond
to an environmental stimulus as a result of observing
another do so (Hinde, 1970 pg. 582). For example, one child
playing with a toy may draw the attention of a second child
to the toy. The second child would then likewise play with
the toy. It is understandable that such instances may be
easily misidentified as imitation. However, the key
distinction between imitation and local enhancement rests in
the stimuli that control the behavior. In the case of
imitation, it is the model or his/her behavior that
functions as the discriminative stimulus for the observer's
matching behavior. Imitation may involve responses that are
directed toward objects (e.g., throwing a ball), but often
it does not. However, in the case of local enhancement, the
17
observer's attention is directed, via the behaviors of the
model, to relevant stimuli (Thorpe, 1941). The model's
presence and even his/her behavior are incidental, save that
they draw attention to an object or location. It is the
object or location itself that controls the observer's
behavior.
Vicarious Emotional Responding
Vicarious classical conditioning. Another area to which
the vicarious notion has been attached is that of emotional
responding in contexts involving stimulus conditions
experienced by others. For example, in vicarious classical
conditioning, a model's response may be classically
conditioned to a particular stimulus while in the presence
of an observer. On the basis of this observation, the same
response by the observer would come under the control of the
same conditioned stimuli which control the model's response
(Bandura, 1969). However, it may be argued that the
conditioning of the observer's behavior is not vicarious.
Apparent vicarious classical conditioning of an
observer's behavior may occur on the basis of traditional
classical conditioning processes such as second-order
conditioning (Catania, 1992). For example, John's
unconditioned response (UCR) of wincing when presented with
an unconditioned stimulus (UCS), such as a mild electrical
current, may be conditioned to occur in response to a tone
18
via the standard classical conditioning process. This
process may occur in the presence of an observer, Tim, who
may then be seen likewise to wince when the tone is
presented. However, the wincing response of others may have
previously been established as a conditioned stimulus (CS)
for Tim's wincing response. Therefore, the tone may function
as a second-order conditioned stimulus (CS2) for Tim's
wincing response after several pairings with John's wincing
behavior (CS1).
The above example illustrates that vicarious notions of
conditioning processes may be unnecessary. Instead,
traditional conditioning concepts would likely explain such
phenomena given a careful process-oriented investigation of
stimulus-response relations.
Vicarious arousal and instigation. Emotional responding
has also been studied under the heading of vicarious
arousal. This is the case when, for example, an observer
responds with fear when a tightrope walker nearly falls off
the wire. Some researchers assert that the fear response of
the observer is vicariously aroused by the near-fall
experience of the performer (Bandura, 1965b, 1969). In the
case of vicarious instigation, the observer would respond
instead to the presumed, unconditioned emotional response of
the performer, whether or not the performer actually emitted
any emotional behavior (Berger, 1962; Green & Osborne,
19
1985).
In each of the three phenomena described above
(vicarious classical conditioning, arousal and instigation),
the vicarious label seems to be attached merely on the basis
that the stimuli to which the observer responds include
stimuli arising from the experiences or responses of others.
However, the observed experience and emotional responses of
others are not vicarious events for the observer. Non-
behavioral theoretical explanations of so-called vicarious
emotional phenomena give no attention to the conditioning
history of the observer. Such considerations would likely
reveal that direct conditioning processes can account for
observer responding.
Implicit Reinforcement
Vicarious phenomena are also found under the heading of
"implicit reinforcement" (Bandura, 1977). Sharpley (1985)
used the term "implicit reward," rather than reinforcement,
to reflect the putative nature of the reinforcer. Implicit
reinforcement/reward should be distinguished from vicarious
reinforcement. In the case of vicarious reinforcement, the
observer does not perform the modeled response during the
period of observation. However, in implicit reinforcement
situations the observer of reinforcement of another's
behavior is concurrently engaged in the same behavior. This
scenario is common in settings where several individuals may
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be engaged simultaneously in the same activity. Often the
behavior of some members of the group is reinforced, but not
that of others. The behavior of one group member may be
"implicitly" reinforced by observed reinforcement of others'
behaviors, in lieu of direct reinforcement. However, Bandura
(1971) points out that non-reinforcement of behaviors
observed to be reinforced when performed by others may also
function as punishment or extinction for the observer's
behaviors. Thus, the term implicit reinforcement is loosely
used to refer to processes that may result in either the
increase or decrease in response rate.
The usual procedure for testing implicit reinforcement
effects involves engaging subjects in a task, either in
small groups or pairs, and selectively reinforcing the
target behavior(s) of target subjects while monitoring the
behavior of the entire group or pair. Implicit reinforcement
procedures typically result in response change by both
target subjects and nontarget peers. For example, in one
study conducted in a second-grade classroom, the attending
behavior of a target subject was reinforced, resulting in
increased attending by both the target subject and a
nontarget peer subjects (Broden, Bruce, Mitchell, Carter &
Hall, 1970).
After a review of the literature, Sharpley (1985)
concluded that reinforcers delivered to target subjects also
21
functioned as reinforcers for the behavior of peers.
However, the same caveats that have been suggested for non-
behavior-analytic interpretations of other vicarious
phenomena apply here. Most studies of implicit
reinforcement/reward take place in classroom or classroom-
like settings. Hence, children in these studies may have had
an extensive history with intermittent reinforcement of
select individuals' behaviors during group activities.
Furthermore, they likely have experience both as one of the
individuals selected for behavior reinforcement and as
observers. On some occasions the child's behavior will have
been reinforced following the observed reinforcement of a
peer's response. Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that
observed reinforcement of a classmate's behavior functions
as a discriminative stimulus for the same behavior of peers.
In fact, Sharpley (1985) found that the discriminative value
of the implicit reward situation was significantly reduced
when subjects were first exposed to a direct reinforcement
condition. That is, when subjects experienced direct
behavior-contingent reinforcement, they failed to show an
increase in target responses during a subsequent implicit
reinforcement condition. Differential responding as a result
of temporal sequencing of conditions indicates that merely
observing reinforcement of a classmate's behavior is not
sufficient to control responding by peers. A functional
22
analysis of the implicit reward situation would be useful to
educators, and others who work with groups, by identifying
better behavior-controlling variables in these settings.
Observational Learning
One of the most widely studied vicarious phenomena is
observational learning. According to Bandura's social
learning theory, operant learning is an unduly cumbersome,
and in many cases dangerous, means of response acquisition.
Instead, most behaviors are more efficiently learned by
observing others (Bandura, 1977; Kanfer, 1965). For
instance, Frank does not need to get stung by a bee to learn
that bees should be avoided. He can benefit from observing
Tom have an unfortunate experience with a bee. For Bandura
(1969), then, observational learning occurs in the absence
both of overt responding by the observer during observation
of the model and of reinforcement (of either the model's or
observer's responses).
Bandura posits observational learning as a bifurcated
process of response acquisition followed by a response
production phase (Bandura, 1977). To him, cognitive
mediating processes, involving attention and memory, allow
for response acquisition in lieu of contingencies. The
observer forms a cognitive representation of the modeled
response, which may then be rehearsed mentally. Bandura
assumes that this cognitive representation can later be used
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to guide the replication of the response by the observer
during the production phase of the process (Bandura, 1977;
Friedman, 1972). In the purest observational learning
scenario, the response is reproduced after an unspecified
time delay in the absence of the model. Proponents of this
view argue that virtually all operantly learned behaviors
can also be acquired via observation. Moreover, Bandura
(1977) states that novel responses can be acquired this way.
The typical test of observational learning involves
exposing subjects to either a live or video recording of a
model performing target responses. The subject's ability to
reproduce the target responses is later assessed. Numerous
researchers have reported that, under these conditions,
subjects imitate modeled motoric responses and performance
on concept transfer, paired- associate learning, verbal
learning, memory, Piagetian conservation, and categorization
tasks (Bandura, Grusec & Menlove, 1966; Bandura, Jeffery &
Bachicha, 1974; Carroll & Bandura, 1982; Chalmers &
Rosenbaum, 1974; Charbonneau, Robert, Bourasa & Gladu-
Bissonnette, 1976; Erbaugh, 1985; Greeson, 1984; McCullagh,
1986; Michael & Maccoby, 1953; Ohnogi, 1985, 1986; Robert &
Fortin, 1983; Vitaro & Robert, 1987; Westman & Westman,
1977). These studies typically emphasize the mediational
processes purported to be involved in observational
learning, rather than possible extrinsic variables.
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For example, Bandura, Grusec and Menlove (1966) showed
6- to 8-year-old children a film of a model performing a
"novel" sequence of behaviors. The children were assigned to
one of three acquisition conditions: 1) facilitative
symbolization, in which they were instructed to verbalize
the actions of the model during the modeling phase, 2)
passive observation, in which the children were directed to
attend closely to the presentation, or 3) competing
symbolization in which they were instructed to count while
watching the presentation. During the subsequent performance
test, the children were asked to perform the modeled
behaviors. The results showed significant group differences
in the mean percent of imitative responses. The facilitative
symbolization group had the highest mean imitation score
followed by the passive observation group. The authors
concluded that verbalizations can facilitate observational
learning by enhancing the mediating and representational
processes involved in response acquisition.
This study is typical of research procedures that have
been used to study observational learning. However, several
limitations bring into question the authors' conclusions.
First, the authors purported to study the acquisition of a
novel sequence of behavior. In fact, subjects were tested
for their ability to reproduce discrete behaviors, not a
sequence. Thus, it is not clear that the subjects acquired
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any novel response, or response pattern, since the behaviors
themselves were likely in the repertoire of most subjects at
the outset (although base levels of the responses were not
assessed). Second, the discrete
behaviors that were tested were prompted by the researchers
with cues designed to focus the recall of subjects on
specific segments of the film. Third, the subjects in this
study were six to eight years of age. The role of experience
in similar situations cannot be overlooked. Young children
are often called upon to "do as I do," and matching behavior
is often reinforced. Finally, the percentage of modeled
responses that were reproduced by the subjects, across all
conditions was very low, from 17.5 to 6.0. While inferential
statistical comparisons of group differences reached
significance, no analyses were reported as evidence of
learning. For instance, the researchers did not show an
increase in response rates relative to base rates of the
target behaviors. In the absence of such evidence, group
comparisons may be inappropriate.
In short, the conclusion of Bandura, Grusec and Menlove
(1966) that mediational and representational processes were
involved in controlling behavior was unwarranted. Though
such processes may always be involved in operant contexts,
they do not rule out operant control of responding under the
specified conditions of the study. A more stringent test of
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observational learning would include determining that the
critical response is not in the subject's repertoire prior
to the acquisition phase. In cases where the learning of a
sequence of responses is of interest, a production test for
the sequence, not individual components, is necessary. To
the extent that such experimental controls have not been
widely implemented, it is not possible to rule out operant
processes as the basis of observational learning.
While, as argued by Bandura (1969), the three-term
contingency paradigm (SD -> R -> SR) cannot account for the
acquisition of novel responses, the notion that diverse
observational learning phenomena may be accounted for by a
single process is simplistic. Other processes such as
shaping, fading and stimulus or response generalization may
be involved for organisms with extensive reinforcement
histories. Alternatively, observational learning may be the
outcome of various other operant processes such as learning-
to-learn, matching-to-sample and generalized imitation
(Gewirtz, 1971b; Gewirtz & Stingle, 1968; Baer & Sherman,
1964). Extensive research is needed to correct the
methodological weaknesses of the studies cited and
systematically to identify functional extrinsic variables
that can account for observational-learning phenomena.
Most of the behavioral phenomena discussed above have
been grouped historically under the rubric of 'vicarious.'
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These include, identification, vicarious classical
conditioning, vicarious arousal, vicarious instigation,
implicit reinforcement and observational learning. It was
noted that evidence for the existence of vicarious events is
predicated on the organism's ability to emit matching
behavior (i.e., imitate). Thus, imitation, while not itself
a vicarious process, is intrinsically related to
vicariousness. The term vicarious has been used in this
paper, as defined by de Charms and Rosenbaum (1960), to
refer to situations in which an observation of a model's
behavior has affected the observer's behavior "as if" it had
been the observer who performed the behavior. Unfortunately,
the stimulus contexts and operational definitions
distinguishing one type of vicarious event from another
often have been unclear in the literature.
To summarize, the purpose of this chapter was two-fold.
First, an effort was made to define clearly, delineate and
explain phenomena to which 'vicarious' labels have been
applied. A distinction was also drawn between social
facilitation and local enhancement, which may appear to fit
the vicarious model, but in fact do not since their root
mechanism is not imitation. Second, the vicarious concepts
discussed were interpreted from a behavior-analytic
perspective. The assertion was made that vicarious
conceptualizations may be abandoned altogether since the
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phenomena at issue may be adequately and parsimoniously
explained by traditional operant processes.
Continuing with this theme, the remainder of this paper
will focus on vicarious reinforcement. Chapter Three
presents an in-depth analysis of the phenomena labeled by
this term and, again, a behavior-analytic interpretation is
offered. Chapter Four presents empirical support for the
behavior-analytic view.
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Chapter III
A Behavior-Analytic Account-of Vicarious Reinforcement
Bandura (1971) defines vicarious reinforcement as "a
change in behavior of observers as a function of witnessing
the consequences accompanying the performance of others" (p.
230). This definition is ambiguous because it does not
specify the direction of behavior change, nor the behavior
of the observer that changes. Indeed, the term vicarious
reinforcement has been used to denote instances of both
observed punishment and reinforcement contingencies for
modeled behaviors (Thelen & Rennie, 1972). Thus, vicarious
reinforcement loosely includes phenomena also labeled as
vicarious punishment and vicarious extinction. Vicarious
punishment and extinction are distinguished from vicarious
reinforcement in that the former two involve the observation
of nominal positive punishment and negative punishment
contingencies, respectively, that result in decreased
responding. Vicarious reinforcement, of course, involves
observation of nominal reinforcement contingencies that
results in increased responding (Bandura, 1969). However,
the three involve observation of contingencies for the
behavior of a model and a subsequent change in the behavior
of the observer "as if" the consequence had been experienced
directly. Therefore, while the following discussion focuses
on vicarious reinforcement, the issues presented likewise
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apply to vicarious punishment and extinction.
From a behavior-analytic perspective the utility of the
term "vicarious reinforcement" is highly questionable. As
indicated above, the term "vicarious reinforcement" is
generally used to describe the case of antecedent stimuli
"reinforcing" an observer's subsequent behavior (Bandura,
1969; Kanfer, 1965). In this sense, "vicarious
reinforcement" is an impossibility (i.e., an oxymoron)
according to operant-conditioning theory, a central
postulate of which is that an extrinsic reinforcing stimulus
must follow (i.e., be the direct consequence of) an actual
response. Thus, stimuli preceding a response cannot function
as reinforcers for that response. Nevertheless, antecedent
stimuli may evoke (i.e., provide the occasion for the
occurrence of) responses that follow them. Without benefit
of a careful functional analysis it is possible to mistake
evocation of a response for reinforcement of the same.
Phenomena typically described as instances of "vicarious
reinforcement" clearly do occur. The literature shows that
vicarious reinforcement procedures can facilitate imitative
responding (Arenson, 1976; Bandura, 1965b; Bandura, Ross &
Ross, 1963; Kanfer, 1965; Rice, 1976). However, these
phenomena can be ordered parsimoniously and efficiently via
conventional operant-learning processes. Non-conditioning
concepts such as "vicarious" are not required and likely
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obscure the relationship between a response and its
controlling environmental stimuli. "Vicarious reinforcement"
may be explained by operant-learning mechanisms involving
the direct relations of the individual's responses with
antecedent and consequential stimuli (Gewirtz, 1971a).
Operant conditioning theorists, such as Gewirtz (1971a),
analyze and explain behavior in terms of direct antecedent
and consequent stimulus conditions. Under this approach, the
three-term contingency, SD-R->SR is the basic unit of
behavior change (Michael, 1993). The three-term contingency
is comprised of an antecedent discriminative stimulus (SD),
that evokes, or sets the occasion for, the occurrence of a
response (R). A discriminative stimulus is an initially
neutral stimulus in the presence of which a response is, at
least occasionally, reinforced. The repeated temporal
contiguity between the neutral stimulus and reinforcement of
the specific response results in the stimulus acquiring
discriminative control of the response. Thus, the SD will
come to cue responses that are likely to be reinforced (SR)
in its presence (Michael, 1993). Stimuli can also acquire
discriminative control of responses that are likely to be
punished in their presences. In this case the presences of
the SD would result in response inhibition. Under this
paradigm, the occurrence of a behavior is controlled by its
antecedent and consequent stimulus conditions.
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Under behavior analysis, observed nominal reinforcement
of a model's behavior can function as an So that evokes
observer behavior which is topographically similar to the
model's. Any stimulus can function as a discriminative cue,
provided it is reliably and systematically paired with
reinforcement of a response or group of responses.
In the typical vicarious reinforcement scenario, the S0
may be the model's response, the consequence of the model's
response, the reinforcer itself, the agent delivering the
reinforcer, a contextual stimulus or any combination of
these that can reliably predict reinforcement of specific
observer responses. Thus, the observer's behavior is
controlled by the observed event, in the context of the
observer's conditioning history, not the consequence to the
model's nominally-reinforced behavior per se. More
importantly, the observed event is an antecedent stimulus
that may evoke the response, not a consequent reinforcer or
punisher of the observer's response.
The theoretical difference of interpretation between
social- learning and operant-learning theories has generated
conflicting conceptual writings and research over the past
35 years. The crux of this debate is whether consequences
must be involved for change in behavior or whether, as
proposed by Bandura (1965a), vicarious processes in lieu of
consequences of behavior can affect that behavior. The
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following is a summary of the investigation and
conceptualization of the phenomena organized under the
rubric of vicarious reinforcement.
Studies of Vicarious Reinforcement
Numerous researchers have investigated the effects of
observed behavioral consequence to a model on the behavior
of the observer (i.e., vicarious reinforcement). The
methodology employed has varied widely and includes single-
subject and group-design procedures as well as a variety of
tasks. The typical study of vicarious effects, however,
involves, first, exposing an observer to a model's behavior
that is nominally reinforced or punished. Then the
observer's matching of the modeled behavior is assessed.
One of the early studies of vicarious reinforcement
tested the effects of exposure to aggression on the
imitative responses of nursery school children (Bandura,
Ross & Ross, 1963). The subjects viewed a film of two male
children that depicted either, 1) nominal 'Reinforcement' of
aggressive behavior, 2) nominal 'Punishment' of the
aggressive behavior or 3) 'No-aggression'. A fourth group of
subjects viewed 'No Film'. All children were then tested in
a similar room containing two five-foot high "Bobo" dolls.
Imitative responses were measured with respect to aggression
toward the Bobo dolls. The results showed that children who
observed reinforcement of aggressive behavior, on average,
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imitated significantly more aggressive behaviors than
children in the other three conditions. These results were
later replicated by Bandura (1965) using a similar
procedure.
The results of the studies of Bandura, Ross and Ross
(1963) and of Bandura (1965) clearly indicated that modeled
nominal reinforcement and punishment consequences can
differentially influence the likelihood of imitative
responses by an observer. The authors concluded that this
phenomenon occurs on the basis of the observer's anticipated
consequences for imitating. By implication, one might assume
that the observer's behavior is controlled solely by current
stimulus conditions. That is, observation of nominal
reinforcement is sufficient to evoke imitation (and visa
versa for punishment). This view is limited in that it
neglects the role of the observer's learning history in
similar stimulus contexts. The omission is common to studies
of vicarious reinforcement.
Increased responding under vicarious reinforcement
conditions was likewise reported by Dubner (1973). Fourth-
grade females viewed a film depicting either 'Reinforcement'
of a model's drawing behavior or 'No-Consequence' for
drawing. A control group was not exposed to the model.
Subjects in the 'Reinforcement' group subsequently drew more
than those in the 'Control' group, but not more than in the
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'No-Consequence' group. This suggests that, for subjects in
the 'Reinforcement' and "No-consequence" group, the model's
behavior functioned as a discriminative event for their
matching responses. However, the role of relevant subject
experience was not discussed.
Walters, Parke and Cane (1965) instructed preschool and
first-grade boys not to touch an array of toys, then showed
the subjects one of three films or 'No Film'. All films
depicted a 6-year-old boy (in the same setting) disobeying
the same instructions followed by 'Punishment',
'Reinforcement' or 'No Consequence' for disobeying. The
subjects were then left alone in the room. The researchers
measured the latency, frequency and duration of touching the
prohibited toys. The 'Punishment' group disobeyed
instructions significantly less often than the other three
groups. These results indicated a unidirectional effect of
observing modeled consequences. That is, observing models
disobey instructions and experiencing nominal reinforcement
or no consequence did not result in subjects in those
conditions being more likely to disobey than did non-
exposure to the model (no-film). However, observation of
nominal punishment for disobeying instructions resulted in
subjects being less likely to disobey than did non-exposure
to the model.
Overall, the results obtained by Walters, Parke and Cane
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(1965) suggest that the observed consequences of the model's
behavior influenced the likelihood that observers would
disobey instructions when confronted with a similar
situation. In the above experiment, the observed
consequences of the model's response in the film apparently
functioned to evoke either matching or avoidant observer
responses, depending on whether the models's responses were
reinforced or punished in the film.
Levy, McClinton, Rabinowitz and Wolkin (1974)
investigated the effects of vicarious reinforcement and
punishment on the forced-choice responses of second-graders.
Subjects observed nominal verbal reinforcement, neutral
verbal statements, nominal verbal punishment or a
combination of the above contingent upon a model's choice
behavior across a series of 24 trials. Then subjects
performed the task themselves. The subjects in the
'Vicarious Reinforcement' group imitated the model's
responses on significantly more than 50 percent of trials,
while those in the 'Vicarious Punishment' group did so on
significantly less than 50 percent of the trials. This study
appears to provide support for both vicarious reinforcement
and vicarious punishment effects.
In a study by Arenson (1976), preschool subjects'
behavior of inserting a stylus into a hole was nominally
reinforced intermittently with candy preceded by the onset
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of a light ('Alone' group). Subjects in the 'Observation'
group witnessed the same behavior contingencies when the
task was performed by a model, and subjects in the 'Control'
group had no exposure to the task prior to the test phase.
During the subsequent test phase, subjects were told they
would receive candy at the conclusion of the test for
inserting the stylus in the correct one of two holes.
Correct responses were signaled by the light. The
'Observation' group made more target responses than did
subjects in the 'Alone' or 'Control' groups. The author
concluded that vicarious reinforcement procedures can affect
observer behavior and that stimuli can become conditioned
reinforcers, in this case the green light, via vicarious
conditioning processes.
The behavior-analytic hypothesis that repeated
observation of a model's behavior and its consequence
functions as a discriminative stimulus for the observer's
behavior does not readily explain Arenson's (1976) finding
that subjects in the 'observation' condition performed
better than those who received direct reinforcement ('alone'
subjects). Under this hypothesis one would expect the
performance of these two groups to be comparable. Thus, an
additional factor beyond the effects of an SD is suggested.
The author proposed that subjects in the 'alone' condition
may have been less "motivated" to perform during the test
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phase because they had already received a supply of candy
during the prior conditioning phase. The author seems to
suggest that the reinforcement value of the candy was
diminished, via satiation, for children in the 'alone'
condition. If so, one possible solution to this confound
would have been to test subjects the following day rather
than immediately after conditioning.
A second possibility is that observation of a model
receiving candy contingent on a target behavior may function
as an establishing operation, increasing the reinforcement
value of the candy for the observer's same behavior.
Subjects who repeatedly observed this event would then be
likely to perform better on subsequent trials than subjects
did not observe the event. However, in the above study, not
only did subjects in the 'alone' condition receive candy
prior to the test, they had previously performed the
response several times. Thus, a third explanation is
plausible; the insertion behavior of children in the 'alone'
condition was subject to an habituation gradient.
Arenson's (1976) results illustrate the difficulty of
drawing explanatory conclusions from findings when the
design and methodology of the study have not exerted strong
experimental control. A replication of this study that
controls for the confounds between the 'alone' and the
'observation' conditions might help explain their
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differential effects. For example, a group that undergoes
conditioning without candy reinforcers prior to testing
might clarify if the performance of 'alone' subjects was due
to satiation of the reinforcer or response habituation.
Consistent with previous studies, Rice (1976) found that
preschool children were more likely to imitate observed
nominally reinforced responses than observed nominally
punished responses. Additionally, Rice (1976), tested
Gewirtz's (1971a) assertion that vicarious reinforcement
events are simply cases of conditional responding. Thus,
such events could cue either imitative or non-imitative
responding, depending on the child's training.
In the 'Natural' condition, imitation of nominally-
reinforced model responses was reinforced and failure to
imitate was punished, while non-imitation of nominally
punished model responses was reinforced and imitation was
punished. The opposite response-consequence relations were
implemented for the 'Reverse' condition. Subjects in the
'Reverse' group required significantly more trials to learn
to respond conditionally than did those in the 'Natural'
condition, and fewer subjects in the 'Reverse' condition
learned to discriminate than did those in the 'Natural'
condition. Rice (1976) concluded that these results fail to
support Gewirtz's conditioning view of vicarious
reinforcement. However, her conclusion may have been
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premature.
These results may actually be consistent with Gewirtz's
position. As Rice (1976) pointed out, the imitation-
contingency relations of the 'Natural' condition were likely
more common to children's experiences than those of the
'Reverse' condition. In other words the 'Natural' condition
was more ecologically valid than the 'Reverse' condition.
However, the conclusions of the author do not reflect this
consideration. If the above assumption is true, group
differences may have been amplified by the subjects'
histories prior to entering the experiment. Specifically,
learning was likely enhanced under the 'Natural' condition
and inhibited under the 'Reverse' condition.
If the 'Reverse' condition depicts the opposite typical
imitation-consequence relation, a longer latency to learn
would be expected under this condition than under the
'natural' condition. Discriminative responding, in the
previously conditioned natural manner, would first have to
be extinguished then reestablished by the opposite stimulus
conditions. Despite the complexity of the task, one quarter
of the subjects under the 'reverse' condition reached the
learning criterion (9 consecutive correct trials out of a
block of 10) in the 90 trials allotted. This suggests that
extended training might have diminished group differences.
In summary, the above studies show that, under certain
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conditions, observation of a model's behavior and its
consequences can control the behavior of the observer
(Arenson, 1976; Bandura, 1965; Bandura, Ross & Ross, 1963;
Levy, McClinton, Rabinowitz & Wolkin, 1974; Rice, 1976;
Walters, Parke & Cane, 1965). One may safely conclude that
when the model's behavior is putatively reinforced, the
observer is more likely to imitate the model than when the
model's behavior is putatively punished or is not followed
by a consequence. However, the assertion that the mechanism
of behavior control was of a vicarious nature is
questionable, theoretically as well as empirically. In
contradiction to the homogeneous results discussed above,
several researchers have shown decrements in mean responding
under vicarious reinforcement conditions.
Bol and Steinhauer (1990) presented 24 same-sex pairs of
preschool subjects with a puzzle task. Correct placement of
puzzle pieces was putatively reinforced either for both
subjects, neither subject or, in the 'Vicarious' group, for
only one subject of the pair. Subjects in the 'Vicarious'
and 'No' reinforcement groups made fewer correct responses
than did those in the 'Direct' reinforcement group.
'Vicarious' reinforcement also resulted in more verbal
aggression, complaints and attention-getting statements than
did 'Direct' reinforcement, which resulted in more
statements of approval, about the simplicity of the task,
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empathy and competition. The authors concluded that
vicarious reinforcement conditions in which observer
responses, similar to those of the model, are not reinforced
directly function to extinguish those observer responses.
The results of this study support the behavior-analytic
hypothesis that phenomena characterized by social-learning
theorists as "vicarious" are in fact maintained by direct
contingencies. If vicarious effects require direct
contingencies for their maintenance, it is likely that they
are also established by direct contingencies. However, this
conclusion cannot be drawn directly from the results of Bol
and Steinhauer (1990) since their study did not control for
the subjects' reinforcement history in similar situations.
In a study by Deguchi, Fujita and Sato (1988), six
children practiced pressing buttons on a control panel
across a series of reinforced trials. Subjects then viewed a
film of a model child pressing buttons on the same control
panel and pressed the buttons themselves under varying
conditions. Under 'Vicarious Reinforcement' (VR) only the
model's responses were reinforced with tokens. Under 'Direct
Reinforcement' (DR) the model's and the subject's matching
responses were reinforced with tokens. Under the 'Simple
Modeling' (SM) condition neither the model nor subject
receive tokens until the conclusion of the session, and in
the 'No Token' (NT) condition neither the model's nor the
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subject's responses were reinforced.
Imitative responds under the VR condition were initially
high, but rapidly decreased and occurred less than under the
SM and DR conditions. DR produced consistently high levels
of imitation, and SM produced sustained high levels of
imitation that eventually decreased for two subjects, but
were maintained for another two subjects. The effects of SM
may have been confounded by the effects of the reinforced
practice trials that subjects experienced prior to
commencing the experimental trials. Since all subjects
received reinforced practice trials, later performance under
SM may have reflected slower extinction of the response,
rather than effects of modeling. Unfortunately, the authors
did not include a control 'no modeling or token' condition
to rule out this possibility. Deguchi, Fujita and Sato
(1988) concluded that vicarious reinforcement should be
conceptualized as a discriminative stimulus that controls
behavior as a result of a history of direct reinforcement.
The results of this study again show that vicarious
reinforcement in the absence of direct reinforcement
ultimately produces extinction of the observer's matching
response. Additionally, a post hoc hypothesis is suggested.
The data from the SM and DR conditions indicated that
observers were more likely to imitate under congruent model-
observer treatments than under incongruent treatments. That
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is, when model and observer behavior consequence were
congruent, both reinforced and neither reinforced, observers
imitated more than when the consequences were incongruent,
as in the VR condition. (Data obtained from the NT condition
suggest likewise; however, their utility is limited since
only one subject was exposed to this treatment for only one
phase.) Thus, it is not the mere presence or absence of
putative reinforcement that determines imitation of a model,
but also the congruence between observed and experienced
consequences for the behavior. Empirical tests of this
hypothesis would likely reveal that discriminative control
of modeled consequences are diminished under incongruent
conditions. In the above study, incongruent conditions
resulted in decreased imitation.
Ollendick, Daily and Shapiro (1983) also compared the
effects of direct (DR) and vicarious reinforcement (VR)
among preschoolers. Same-sex pairs performed a puzzle-
completion task. One subject received continuous
reinforcement (CRF) for correct puzzle completion while the
other subject (observer) received no reinforcement. Correct
placement of puzzle pieces increased for subjects in the CRF
group. The VR group initially performed comparably to the
CRF group, but subsequently showed decreased responding.
Consistent with previous studies, the vicarious
reinforcement condition resulted in extinction of the
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observers' matching behaviors. While not systematically
measured, subjects who experienced vicarious reinforcement
verbalized statements such as "Come on, I can do them too,"
"Look at me too," and "I quit." This anecdotal evidence is
consistent with the Bol and Steinhauer (1990) results which
suggested that vicarious reinforcement was aversive to
subjects.
The Ollendick, Dailey and Shapiro (1983) results were
replicated by Ollendick and Shapiro (1984) with first-
through sixth-grade children. Pairs of same-sex, same-grade
children performed the digit symbol sub-test of the Wechsler
Intelligence Scale for Children-Revised (see Seashore,
Westman, & Doppelt, 1950). At the end of each trial, one
child received social praise for performance (DR), while the
other did not (VR). In a Control group, neither child
received praise. Overall, VR resulted in fewer mean correct
responses than either the DR or Control Conditions. The yR
condition was also associated with a greater mean number of
"affective responses" (e.g., complaints about not receiving
praise) than DR or control conditions. Again, it may be
concluded that the vicarious reinforcement condition, in the
absence of directed reinforcement, hindered performance and
increase subjects' verbalizations suggesting that the
condition was aversive.
Studies showing decrements in responding under
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vicarious- reinforcement conditions clearly suggest that
observation of a model's reinforced behavior is not
sufficient to maintain imitative responding in young
children (Bol & Steinhauer, 1990; Deguchi, Fujita & Sato,
1988; Ollendick, Daily & Shapiro, 1983; Ollendick & Shapiro,
1984). The matching response must be directly reinforced, at
least occasionally; if not, the matching response will
extinguish. These studies support the hypothesis that the
role of historical and contextual variables must be included
in a functional analysis of "vicarious" phenomena. Factors
that should be considered part of such an analysis include
the reinforcement history of the same (or similar) observer
responses, the reinforcement history of imitative responses
in general and the history with the reinforcer itself.
Nevertheless, there is well-established contradictory
evidence that vicarious reinforcement can lead to response
increases (Arenson, 1976; Bandura, 1965; Bandura, Ross &
Ross, 1963; Dubner, 1973; Levy, McClinton, Rabinowitz &
Wolkin, 1974; Rice, 1976; Walters, Parke & Cane, 1965). Such
incompatible findings should not be regarded as reflecting
that the behavioral phenomena under study are of a transient
nature. It is important, instead, to identify the stimulus
conditions that may lead to response increase versus
decrease. The conflicting results of researchers showing
response increases under vicarious reinforcement conditions
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versus those showing response decreases may be accounted for
by the systematic procedural differences noted between the
two groups of studies.
Studies that have demonstrated response increases under
vicarious-reinforcement conditions have implemented
observation and performance phases sequentially (Arenson,
1976; Bandura, 1965; Bandura, Ross & Ross, 1963; Dubner,
1973; Levy, McClinton, Rabinowitz & Wolkin, 1974; Rice,
1976; Walters, Parke & Cane, 1965). The subjects in these
studies first observed modeled contingencies, then were
tested for imitation. These studies essentially employed a
one-trial procedure. However, studies reporting response
decreases under vicarious reinforcement conditions have used
either a multiple-trials procedures in which the model and
subject take turns making choice responses (Deguchi, Fujita
& Sato, 1988) or a concurrent procedure in which subject
pairs were concurrently engaged in the designated task (Bol
& Steinhauer, 1990; Ollendick, Dailey & Shapiro, 1983;
Ollendick & Shapiro, 1984). A second systematic difference
arising out of one-trial sequential versus multiple-trial
and concurrent procedures is that in the former procedures
subjects experience no consequence for either imitating or
failing to imitate. However, in multiple-trial and
concurrent procedures the subject's responding is placed on
an "extinction" schedule during vicarious reinforcement
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conditions, insofar as only the model's behavior is
reinforced.
The question of how such procedural differences lead
systematically to opposite effects is one that has yet to be
addressed empirically. However, in keeping with behavior-
analytic conceptions, the following hypothesis is offered.
It may be assumed reasonably that subjects enter an
experiment with a history of reinforcement for imitative
behaviors. Moreover, a subject's imitative behavior may have
frequently been reinforced following observed putative
reinforcement of the same behavior by a peer. Repeated
exposure to this scenario would be sufficient to establish
the reinforcement of peer behavior as an effective SD for
the observer (the inverse would be true for observed
punishment).
Given this assumption, one-trail sequential procedures
may not significantly reduce the discriminative function of
the observed nominal reinforcement, while multiple-trials
and concurrent procedures result in just that. That is, over
multiple trails (or during concurrent model-observer
responding conditions) in which observation of reinforcement
(i.e., the SD) fails to occasion reinforcement for the
subject's imitative responses, the SD ceases to function as
such and the imitative responding is extinguished.
This hypothesis is supported by the results of studies
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showing an initial increase followed by a significant
decrease in target responding under multiple-trial or
concurrent performance vicarious-reinforcement conditions
(Deguchi, Fujita & Sato, 1988; Ollendick, Daily & Shapiro,
1983). Empirical tests of this hypothesis would contribute
to an integrated understanding of behavior under various
discriminative conditions historically labeled "vicarious."
Furthermore, such tests would likely help resolve the
dispute between the social-learning and the operant-
conditioning theories of vicarious reinforcement.
In summary, the phenomenon of "vicarious reinforcement"
among young children is robustly established (Arenson, 1976;
Levy, McClinton, Rabinowitz & Wolkin, 1974; Walters, Parke &
Cane, 1965). However, there is equally strong evidence that,
under certain conditions, vicarious reinforcement results in
response reduction rather than increase (Bol & Steinhauer,
1990; Deguchi, Fujita & Sato, 1988; Ollendick, Dailey &
Shapiro, 1983; Ollendick & Shapiro, 1984). Procedural
differences have been cited as possible determinants of
contradictory effects.
However, each of the studies surveyed shares a critical
methodological weakness. Researchers have failed to control
for their observer subjects' histories of direct, if
intermittent, reinforcement contingencies in situations
similar to the researchers' testing procedure. The present
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experiment investigated the role of earlier direct-
contingency learning on a subsequent vicarious-
reinforcement-type task.
Experiment 1 was designed to replicate positive
vicarious reinforcement effects reported by others (e.g.,
Bandura, Ross & Ross, 1963; Dubner 1973; Levy, McClinton,
Rabinowitz & Wolkin, 1974; Walters, Parke & Cane, 1965). It
was hypothesized that, in the absence of direct positive
reinforcement in the testing situation, children would tend
to imitate a model's behavior only when the mode's behavior
was putatively reinforced. However, this imitation is
believed to occur as a result of a history of reinforcement
for imitative behaviors in general, and not to be due to
vicarious reinforcement.
Experiment 2 investigated the role of prior learning on
subjects' performance in a vicarious-reinforcement
situation. It was predicted that preschool children would
imitate a model's observed reinforced responses when the
observer had likewise experienced reinforcement of the same
response, but not when the observer had experienced
punishment of that response. That is, observation of
reinforcement of a model's behavior should function as a
discriminative stimulus only for subjects who had
experienced reinforcement of the same behavior.
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Chapter IV
Method
Experiment 1
Subiects. Subjects were 32 2.83- to 5.83-year-old
children (N = 4.44, SD = 0.80), 17 males and 15 females, who
were recruited from 10 preschools in the greater Miami,
Florida area. Information and consent forms were distributed
to parents by school officials. The sample was drawn from
those children whose parents returned signed forms. There
were no other criteria for inclusion in the study. The
ethnic composition of the final sample consisted of 1
Indian, 3 Black, 15 White non-hispanic, and 13 Hispanic
children.
Subjects were tested in same-sex pairs (except for two
pairs). Because testing was restricted by the availability
of subjects, assignment of same-sex subjects to pairs could
not be conducted randomly. Instead, each testing day
classroom teachers were given a list of students to be
tested from her class. Teachers designated which students
could be removed from the class and when, depending on the
scheduled classroom activities. Thus, subject pairs were
determined by the first two available same-sex children.
Subjects were also matched on years of age and classroom
to the extent possible. The average age difference between
partners was 3.84 months (SD = 3.36 mo.). Age differences
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ranged from 0 (N= 1) to 12 months (N = 1), with only four
pairs exceeding an age difference of six months. All but one
pair of subjects shared a classroom.
Stimuli and Setting
The stimuli were four 3 in. x 5 in. irregular, novel
shapes cut out of paper (see Figure 1). There were 5 green
and 5 yellow reproductions of each shape, totalling 40
stimuli. These were combined into 20 stimulus pairs. Each
pair consisted of two different shapes, one green and one
yellow. A red three-ring binder containing 20 laminated
photo-album pages was used to present the stimuli. The
stimuli were arranged such that, as the pages were turned,
one of the two facing pages was blank. Thus, on each trial,
only one stimulus pair was in view at one time. The
orientation of the shapes on the page were rotated
approximately 180 degrees on some of the trials. The lateral
positions of the stimuli were quasi-randomly determined with
the condition that the same color or shape not appear on the
same side of the page on more than two consecutive trials.
Two identical stimulus binders were used. A scoring
sheet was used to record the subject's response on each
trial (See Appendix). The sheet was kept at the back of the
binder, out of view of the subject, during the procedure.
Subjects were tested in school areas designated by
school directors. The areas were generally quiet and free
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from distractions. At the conclusion of the session,
subjects were given their choice from a variety of stickers.
Design
Two independent variables were manipulated in a 2
(Treatments) X 2 (Phases) repeated-measures mixed design.
The procedure consisted of three phases: 1) Baseline (A), 2)
Conditioning (B) or Observation (C), and 3) Test (A -- i.e.,
return to the baseline condition). Both members of each pair
underwent the Baseline and Test phases (within-subjects
repeated measures). One member of each pair underwent the
Conditioning (N = 16) treatment and the other underwent the
Observation treatment (N = 16), Thus, subjects in
Conditioning treatment experienced Baseline, Conditioning
and Test (ABA) while those in the Observation treatment
experienced Baseline, Observation and Test (ACA).
The Conditioning and Observation Phases were not
included as levels of the independent variable Phase because
these two treatments were not comparable. Specifically,
subjects in the Observation treatment could not respond
during that phase of the procedure, as they were passively
observing, while subjects in the Conditioning treatment of
course did respond. Also, subjects in the Conditioning
treatment, and their partners, were required to meet a
learning criterion (described below) in order to be included
in the final sample. Thus, performance during the
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Conditioning phase was not free to vary.
Subject pairs were assigned either the Green or Yellow
stimuli as targets. The Green stimuli were the target for
seven subject pairs in each Treatment and the Yellow stimuli
were the target for nine subject pairs in each Treatment.
The procedure for assignment of target color is described
below.
Procedure
Subject pairs were accompanied to the testing area by
two adult-female experimenters. Upon entering the room both
subjects were instructed by an experimenter as follows:
"We are going to play a game. If you win, you get a
sticker. Pick the sticker that you want to win."
Each subject then selected a sticker and the experimenter
continued:
"I'm going to put your stickers away until after the
game. Remember, you get to keep the sticker if you
win."
Each subject was then seated with an experimenter. The
experimenters began the procedure simultaneously for both
subjects.
Baseline _(A). The purpose of the baseline phase was to
assess initial preferences for each stimulus color in order
to determine assignment of pairs to target colors. Subjects
were seated back-to-back and as far apart as possible so
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that they could not see each other, in order to minimize
distraction. At the start of the baseline phase the
experimenters instructed the subjects as follows:
"We are going to play the game now. I'm going to show
you two things at a time. All you have to do to win the
game is pick the best one by pointing at it. If you pick
the best one enough times you win the game and get the
sticker. Do you understand?"
If the subject indicated that he/she did not understand, the
experimenter repeated and clarified the instructions. If the
subject responded affirmatively, the experimenter proceeded.
"Before we play the game, let's do it once just for
practice."
Each subject was, concurrently, then given 20 Baseline
trials. Each trial began with the presentation of a stimulus
pair and the instruction to "Pick the best one." A trial
ended when the subject pointed to one of the two stimuli.
The color selected on each trial was recorded. The
experimenters maintained a neutral expression throughout the
baseline phase, provided no feedback and made no eye contact
with the subjects.
Target colors were assigned immediately following
Baseline. The experimenters asked the subjects to wait for
one moment while they conferred. The procedure for assigning
target colors was designed to minimize the effects of
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initial color preferences on test performance and to show
the maximum magnitude of response change from Baseline to
the Conditioning and Test phases. Thus, subjects were
assigned as their Target Color the color that was least
preferred during baseline.
A color preference was defined as selecting the same
color on at least 11 of the 20 trials (55 %). The Target
Color assignment procedure was as follows. If neither
subject in a pair showed a color preference, either target
color was assigned. (However, this was not the case for any
subject pairs in Experiment 1.) If only one member of a pair
had a color preference, the pair was assigned the color
least preferred by that subject (N = 6 pairs). If both
subjects had the same color preference, the pair was
assigned the opposite target color (N = 5 pairs). For cases
in which the members of a pair showed opposite color
preferences, the pair was reserved to serve as subjects in
Experiment 2 (see Table 1).
This procedure was followed to the extent possible.
However, it was necessary to make exceptions in order to
fill the final treatment cells. Thus, in situations in which
one (N = 4 pairs) or both (N = 1 pair) members of a pair
showed a preference, and it was not possible to run the pair
in Experiment 2, the color least preferred by the two
subjects was assigned as the target color. This resulted in
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six of the 32 subjects having baseline target preferences
above 50 percent. Following assignment of target colors one
subject was assigned to the Conditioning treatment and the
other to the Observation treatment.
onitionin( an Obseraion . As one member of
the pair was going through the Conditioning phase, the other
was observing. The purpose of the Conditioning phase was to
condition the subject's response of choosing the target
color and to expose the 'Observing' subject to reinforcement
of the 'Conditioning' subject's target response.
The subjects were seated side-by-side and the
experimenter presenting the stimuli sat directly in front of
the 'Conditioning' subject. The second experimenter sat
beside the 'Observing' subject to ensure that he/she
attended to the game. If the 'Observing' subject looked away
from the task or spoke, the second experimenter got the
'Observing' subject's attention by tapping his/her shoulder
and whispered "pay attention" or gestured "be quiet." Before
commencing, both subjects were instructed as follows:
"O.K., that was just practice. Now let's play the game
for real. [Name of Conditioning subject], you get to go
first and [name of observing subject] you get to watch,
later you will get to play. The rules of the game are
that you cannot talk. Both of you must pay very close
attention. [Name of Conditioning subject] pick the best
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one by pointing to it [Name of observing subject] watch
[name of Conditioning subject] very carefully."
Each of 40 trials began with the same prompt, to "Pick
the best one." Target responses were followed immediately
with verbal praise such as, "That's right." "Good choice,
that one is best." and "Yes, that's the right one." The
experimenter verbalized the praise in a very happy tone of
voice (i.e., high pitch and volume) while looking and
smiling at the child. Non-target responses were followed by
putative verbal punishment in the form of, "No, that's
wrong." and "Sorry, that's not the best one." The
experimenter maintained a sad face and voice (i.e., low
pitch and volume) on punishment trials. Color choice was
recorded on each trial.
Subjects in the Conditioning treatment were required to
meet a 75 percent learning criterion. That is, the subjects
were required to choose the target color on 30 of the 40
conditioning trials, including on the last five trials.
Three subjects, and their partners, who failed to meet this
criterion were dropped from the sample. The purpose of this
criterion was to ensure that subjects in the Conditioning
treatment learned to emit the target response and to give
subjects in the Observation treatment ample exposure to the
reinforced responses of their partners. This criterion was
expected to optimize the effects of both the direct
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reinforcement (conditioning) and the observation of
reinforcement on performance during the test phase, and to
eliminate possible effects of non-random assignment of
subjects to groups.
Test (A) - The Test phase was run concurrently for both
subjects and exactly as the Baseline phase. Both subjects
were seated at their original position with the same
experimenter as during Baseline. The subject in the
Conditioning treatment was told:
"You're doing a good job. Let's do it one more time to
see if you can win the sticker. This time I'm not going
to tell you if you choose the right one or not. I'm
going to be quiet, but I want you to still pick the best
one."
The subject in the Observation treatment was told:
"Now it's your turn to play the game. I'm not going to
tell you if you pick the right one, but I want you to
pick the best one so you can win the sticker."
Each subject was then given 20 test trials. Experimenters
again maintained a neutral face and provided no feedback or
eye contact. The dependent measure was the proportion of
target responses. For subjects in the Observation treatment,
target responses represented imitative responses.
Results
Proportion of target response scores were calculated for
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the Baseline phase (Baseline Target Proportion [BTP]) and
Test phase (Test Target Proportion [TTP]) by dividing the
number of target responses by the total number of trials
(20). These scores were analyzed using a 2 (Treatments,
Conditioning and Observation) X 2 (Phases, Baseline and
Test) repeated measures, within- and between-subjects ANOVA.
The same analysis using arcsine transformations of the
proportion data yielded the same conclusions. Therefore,
only the results of the proportion data are reported.
Both Treatment groups were predicted to show an increase
in target-response means from Baseline to Test phase.
Therefore, a main effect of Phase was expected. Neither a
main effect of Treatment nor Treatment X Phase interaction
effect was expected. The hypotheses were supported by the
ANOVA results. Inspection of group means, in Table 2, shows
increased target-responding means across Phases (F1 30 =
71.44, p < .001) for both Treatments. There was no
significant Treatment (F 1 3 0 = 0.27, p > .10) or Treatment X
Phase interaction effect (F1 30 = 0.65, p > .10).
Secondary analyses were conducted to ensure homogeneity
of Treatment groups on baseline performance. A two-sample t-
test revealed no significant difference between the
Conditioning and Observation treatment on mean BTP scores
(130 = 0.19, p > .10). Analyses were also conducted to
assess for sex differences and differences on test
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performance due to Target Color. There was no significant
difference between females (N = 15) and males (N = 17) as
indicated by a 2 (Sex) X 2 (Phase) repeated measures ANOVA
on proportion of target responding across Baseline and Test
phases (F 1 3 = 0.73, p > .10).
A two-sample t-test on TTP scores by Target Color was
used to determine the effect of Target Color on performance
during the Test phase. This t-test revealed a significant
difference between the group of subjects who were assigned
the Green (N = 14, M = .729, SD = .272) stimuli and the
group assigned the Yellow (N = 18, 1 = .906, SD = .159)
stimuli as targets (3o = 2.30, p < .05). However, since the
variable Target Color was crossed with the variable
Treatments, the significant Target Color effect is unlikely
to qualify the primary findings. This conclusion is
supported by the finding that mean TTP scores were
significantly above chance (i.e., 50%) for both the
Conditioning (M5 = 7.723, p < .01) and observation (t15 =
4.388, p < .05) treatment groups, regardless of Target
Color.
Conclusions
The results of Experiment 1 are consistent with those of
vicarious reinforcement studies that have reported positive
effects (Bandura, Ross & Ross, 1963; Dubner 1973; Levy,
McClinton, Rabinowitz & Wolkin, 1974; Walters, Parke & Cane,
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1965). Consistent with the cited studies, a sequential
procedure was used in which subjects in the Observation
treatment first observed their partner "play the game" and
then were tested. However, the design of Experiment 1
improved upon those of previous studies by adding a baseline
phase. This allowed for the control of initial levels of the
target response in two manners. First, baseline assessments
allowed experimenters to assign the non-preferred color as
the target. This ensured that a high level of target
responses on the test phase was due to the intervening
treatment phase, and not to initial preferences. Second, it
was possible to include the variance due to base levels of
the dependent variable in the statistical analyses. That is,
the performance of subjects on the test phase was assessed
relative to their baseline level of responding using a
repeated-measures ANOVA.
As discussed above, it was assumed that imitation in
this testing situation could be a function of the child's
learning history. Thus, observed reinforcement of a model's
behavior should function as a discriminative stimulus for
the matching response of the observer. Unfortunately, this
assumption is difficult, if not impossible, to test directly
since the experimenter cannot control the subject's learning
history prior to the experiment. However, within the context
of the experiment, it is possible to contrive an
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immediately-earlier history of reinforcement or punishment
for target responses. This recent history would be
superimposed, if temporarily, on the subject's history of
learning prior to entering the experiment. That is, subjects
could learn to discriminate contingencies in the context of
the experimental setting that may not have been in place on
previous settings. This approach was used in Experiment 2 in
order to show that imitation under vicarious reinforcement
conditions may be controlled by the subject's prior
experience with contingencies, not by the mere observation
of a model's responses and its contingencies.
Experiment_2
Experiment 2 tested the hypothesis that modeled behavior
that is observed to be reinforced would not function as a
discriminative stimulus for matching observer behavior, if
the observer did not likewise have a history of
reinforcement of that behavior. Subjects learned to choose a
target color and observed reinforcement of a peer's behavior
of choosing either the same (Congruent treatment) or
different (Incongruent treatment) color.
Subjects. Subjects were 48 3.00- to 5.75-year-old
children (M = 4.49, SD = 0.66), 27 males and 25 females, who
were recruited from 7 preschools in the greater Miami,
Florida area. Information and consent forms were distributed
to parents by school officials. The sample was drawn from
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those children whose parents returned signed forms. There
were no other criteria for inclusion in the study. The
ethnic composition of the final sample consisted of 2 Black,
28 White non-Hispanic and 18 Hispanic children.
Subjects were tested in same-sex pairs. The procedure
for assignment of subjects to pairs was the same as in
Experiment 1. Subjects were also matched on years of age and
classroom to the extent possible. The average age difference
between partners was 4.32 months (SD = 4.20 mo.). Age
differences ranged from 0 (N = 4) to 15 months (N = 1), with
six pairs exceeding an age difference of six months. Of the
24 pairs of subjects, 21 shared a classroom.
Stimuli and Setting. The stimuli were the same as those used
in Experiment 1.
Design, Three independent variables were manipulated in
a fully-counterbalanced 2 (Treatments) X 2 (Phases) X 2
(Treatment Orders) mixed design. The two levels of the
between-subjects factor Treatments were Congruent (N = 24)
and Incongruent (N = 24). In the Incongruent treatment one
member of each pair was assigned the Green (N = 24) stimulus
as the Target Color and the other member was assigned the
Yellow (N = 24). In the Congruent treatment, both subjects
in each pair were assigned the same Target Color (either
Green or Yellow). Assignment of subject pairs to Treatments
and of individual subjects to Target Color was not random,
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but was determined by performance during the Baseline phase.
The Treatment and Target Color assignment procedure is
described below. Table 4 depicts the complete design of
Experiment 2.
Procedure
Experiment 2 consisted of the same three treatments as
Experiment 1. However, in Experiment 2 the Conditioning and
Observation treatments were within-subjects factors. Thus,
all subjects went through four phases, Baseline (A1),
Conditioning (B), Observation (C) and Test (A). The
Baseline phase was the first phase and the Test phase was
the last for all subjects. Both subjects in each pair went
through the Baseline and Test phases concurrently. The
Treatment Order of Conditioning and Observation phases was
counterbalanced within and across subject pairs. Thus, the
Conditioning phase for each subject was simultaneously the
Observation phase for his/her partner.
One subjects of each pair was assigned to the
Conditioning-First (CF, N = 24) Treatment Order and the
other to the Observation-First (OF, N = 24) Treatment Order.
Subjects in the CF group experienced an ABCA phase order,
while those in the OF group experienced an ACBA phase order
(see Figure 2). The instructions given to the subjects were
the same as those of Experiment 1. However, they were
repeated when it was the second subject's turn to "play the
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game."
Assignment of subjects to Treatment Order, Treatment and
Target Color was done immediately following baseline.
Assignment of one subject to the CF Treatment Order resulted
in the second subject automatically being assigned to the OF
Treatment Order. The procedure for assignment of the pair to
either the Congruent or Incongruent group and of individual
subjects to a Target Color was as follows.
If neither subject in a pair showed a color preference
during Baseline, the pair was assigned to either the
Congruent or Incongruent treatment and the subjects were
assigned either the Green or Yellow Target Color. If only
one member of the pair showed a color preference, the pair
was assigned to either treatment and the subject with the
preference was assigned the non-preferred color. If both
subjects had the same color preference, the pair was
assigned to the Congruent treatment and assigned the non-
preferred color as the target. If each subject had a
preference for the opposite color as their partner, the pair
was assigned to the Incongruent treatment, and subjects were
assigned their non-preferred color. As in Experiment 1, this
procedure was followed to the extent possible. However, as
treatment cells were filled, deviation from the procedure
was necessary. It was not possible to assign both members of
a pair to their non-preferred color. Thus, five subjects had
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Baseline scores above 50 percent.
The purpose of the Conditioning phase was to provide a
history of reinforcement of the target response. Since
performance on the test phase was hypothesized to be a
function of learning, it was important to ensure that
learning occurred during the Conditioning phase. Thus, a
strict criterion of 75 percent target responding was imposed
for the Conditioning phase. Fifteen pairs, for which one or
both subject failed to meet this criterion, were dropped
from the sample, eight from the Incongruent treatment and
seven from the Congruent treatment. The learning criterion
also eliminated possible effects that may have been due to
possible non-random assignment of subjects to groups,
because it ensured that all subjects learned to select their
target color prior to the test phase.
Results
The proportion of target responses for individual
subjects was calculated for Baseline (BTP) and Test (TTP)
phases by dividing the number of target responses in each
phase by the number of trials (20). A 2 X 2 X 2 repeated-
measures ANOVA was run on Treatment (Congruent versus
Incongruent) by Order (Conditioning First [CF] vs
Observation First [OF]) with Phase (Baseline and Test) as
the repeated factor. A significant effect of Phase was
predicted. No significant Treatment, Order or interaction
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effect was expected.
The results supported the hypotheses advanced. There was
found a significant main effect of Phase (F1 44  69.15, p <
.001). There was found no significant effect of Treatment
(F1,44 = 0.59, p > .05) or Order (F1,44 = 2.29, p > .05). There
were also no significant two-way interactions. However,
contrary to the predictions, a significant Treatment X Order
X Phase interaction effect (F 1, 44 = 6.71, p < .05) was found.
In order to determine the nature of the reliable
Treatment X Order X Phase interaction, the two-way
interactions were further investigated. Repeated-measures
ANOVAs were run separately on Phase X Treatment for the
Conditioning-First and Observation-First groups and
separately on Phase X Order for the Incongruent and
Congruent treatment groups.
The Phase X Treatment ANOVA for the Conditioning-First
group yielded a significant main effect of Phase (F1 22
26.88, p < .001) qualified by a significant Phase X
Treatment interaction (F122 = 6.65, p < .05), but no
significant effect of Treatment (F1 2 = 2.04, p > .05). The
Phase X Treatment ANOVA for the Observation-First group
yielded a significant main effect of Phase (F 22 = 46.58, p
< .001) and no significant Treatment (F1 2 = 0.18, p > .05)
nor Phase X Treatment interaction (F1,22 = 0.86, p > .05).
Thus, the levels of the variable Order (i.e., Conditioning-
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First and Observation-First) differentially effect the
outcomes of the variables Phase and Treatment.
The Phase X Order ANOVA for the Congruent treatment
group revealed a significant main effect of Phase (F1 22
42.17, p < .001). There was no significant main effect of
Order nor Phase X Order interaction. The Phase X Order ANOVA
for the Incongruent group yielded a significant main effects
of Phase (F122 = 27.13, p < .001), Order (F, 22 = 4.03, p =
.05) and a significant Phase X Order interaction (F1 22
4.55, p < .05). Thus, the levels of Treatment (i.e.,
Congruent and Incongruent) differentially affected the
outcomes of the variables Phase and Order and the two-way
interaction of Phase X Order.
Interpreted collectively, the results of the above 2 X 2
ANOVAs indicate that the three-way interaction of the Phase
X Treatment X Order ANOVA may be attributable to an
interaction among all three independent variables. However,
a conclusive explanation of the three-way interaction was
not possible.
Additionally, all subjects were expected to show a high
proportion of target responses during the test phase,
regardless of their Treatment or Treatment Order status.
Independent t-tests against a null hypothesis of 50 percent
on mean TTP scores for each Treatment group supported the
above hypothesis. Subjects in the Congruent (M = .871, SD
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=.391, L23 = 4.64, p <.05) and Incongruent Treatments (N =
.754, SD = .391, t23= 4.64, p < .05) had TTP score means
significantly above chance.
Secondary analyses were conducted to ensure that
subjects in the Congruent and Incongruent treatments did not
differ initially on baseline performance. A two-sample t-
test revealed no significant difference in the mean
proportion of target response during baseline (36 = 0.48, p
> .10). There was also no significant sex difference as
indicated by a 2 (Sex) X 2 (Phase) repeated measures ANOVA
on TTP score means across Baseline and Test (F 1 78 = 0,54, p
> .10).
A two-sample t-test on TTP score means by Target Color
revealed that subjects who were assigned the Yellow stimuli
as targets (N = 26, M = .910, SD = .214) had a significantly
higher mean proportion of target responses on the Test phase
than those who were assigned the Green (N = 22, M = .698, SD
= .424) stimuli as targets ( 30 = 2.24, p < .05). However,
this unexpected result is not believed to qualify any of the
primary findings since, as noted above, subjects in both the
Congruent and Incongruent treatments chose their target
colors on significantly more than 50 percent of the test
trials. Additionally, the factor Target Color was crossed in
the experiment with the factors Treatment and Treatment
Order.
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Finally, in order to ensure that the subsample of
subjects who failed to meet the learning criterion (and were
thus dropped from the sample) did not differ initially from
the final sample, a two-sample t-test was conducted on the
mean BTP scores of the two groups. There was no significant
difference found on the mean proportion of target responses
during Baseline between the subsample of subjects who were
dropped from the study (N = 30, N = .430, SD = .137) and the
final sample (N = 48, M = .395, SD = .192, t46 = 0.875 p >
.10). Therefore, the two groups appeared to differ only with
respect to their rate of learning. Because the main
hypothesis of the study was that prior conditioning would
determine performance on the test phase, the purpose of the
learning criterion was to ensure conditioning of the target
response. Thus, the generalizability of the overall results
are not believed to be diminished by the exclusion of
subjects who did not meet the criterion of learning. It is
likely that subjects who were dropped from the sample on
this basis would have met the learning criterion if given
additional training and would have subsequently performed
similarly to the final sample on the test phase.
Conclusions
The results of Experiment 2 supported the behavior-
analytic theoretical position that imitation under
vicarious-reinforcement conditions is a function of the
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observer's learning history. Subjects who had experienced
behavior contingencies that were Congruent with those
observed showed a high level of target responses on the
subsequent test phase. In previous research, which did not
include a direct Conditioning phase, such outcomes following
observed reinforcement of the target response had been
interpreted to result from vicarious reinforcement. However,
the contrasting performances of the Congruent and the
Incongruent treatment groups in this experiment suggest
otherwise.
Subjects who had experienced behavior contingencies that
were Incongruent with those observed likewise showed a high
level of mean target response during the test phase.
Consistent with the main hypothesis, observed behavior of a
model and/or its reinforcement behavior did not function as
a discriminative stimulus when the observer had a history of
punishment, rather than reinforcement, for that response.
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Chapter V
Discussion
A key feature of the behavior-analytic approach, vis-a-
vis Bandura's social-learning theory, is that consequences
can be linked directly not to the observer's behavior, but
to the performer's behavior. Thus consequences can function
as reinforcers only for performer behaviors. However, in
social-learning theory, when the behavior of one individual
is altered by the observation of consequences to another's
behavior (in the absence of the observer's same behavior and
its direct reinforcement), "vicarious reinforcement" has
been said to have occurred (Bandura, 1977). Thus, social-
learning theory maintains that simply observing consequences
to the behavior of another can determine the behavior of the
observer, in the same way as can direct contingencies for
explicit behavior. However, the results of the present study
did not support the social-learning conceptualization of so-
called vicarious-reinforcement phenomena.
The main postulate of this paper has been that modeled
behavior and its nominal reinforcement can function as a
discriminative stimulus for an observer's matching
responses, provided that the observer also has a history of
reinforcement for the same or similar responses. With the
exception of a study by Deguchi, Fujita and Sato (1988),
previous researchers have generally failed to address the
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role of prior learning in this context.
In the present study, Experiment 1 supported the
findings of earlier researchers espousing the social-
learning conceptualization of vicarious reinforcement. The
results showed that preschool children will imitate a peer's
reinforced response. However, the sequential-phases
procedure and between-subjects design used in Experiment 1,
as in prior studies, was insufficient to account for the
effect of the observers' learning history on this
apparently-vicarious phenomenon.
Experiment 2 investigated the effects of prior learning
in similar settings on the performance of subjects in a
vicarious-reinforcement situation. Subjects were exposed to
both direct reinforcement and observed reinforcement of
target responses. The effects of vicarious reinforcement,
had they existed, should have resulted in significantly
decreased target responses for the Incongruent treatment
group relative to the Congruent treatment group. However,
the performance of the Incongruent and Congruent treatment
groups did not differ significantly on the test phase, and
both groups showed mean target-response proportions
significantly above base levels. Thus, subjects in the
Incongruent group, on average, did not imitate reinforced
modeled responses. Instead, the responding of subjects in
this group was controlled by their conditioning history.
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This finding supported the behavior-analytic
conceptualization of vicarious reinforcement as a case of
discriminative responding by suggesting strongly that
apparent vicarious-reinforcement effects are likely to be a
result of the discriminative value of the observed
reinforced response, as a result of a Congruent history of
reinforcement for that same response by the observer.
Previous research had only indirectly suggested the same by
showing that vicarious-reinforcement conditions can function
to extinguish observer matching responses (Bol & Steinhauer,
1990; Deguchi, Fujita & Sato, 1988; Ollendick, Daily &
Shapiro, 1983; Ollendick & Shapiro, 1984).
However, two limitations may be noted in the present
study. First, it was not possible to determine if
discrimination was learned on the basis of reinforcement or
punishment contingencies because the Conditioning phase, in
both experiments, consisted of reinforcement of target
responses and punishment of non-target responses. Second,
with respect to the Observation treatments of both
experiments, the discriminative value of the contingencies
for the model's responses and that of the responses
themselves were confounded. Therefore, it may be argued that
the present study provides an analysis of factors
controlling simple imitation, rather than imitation due to
vicarious reinforcement. However, the Observation treatment
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was consistent with the vicarious-reinforcement conditions
of previous studies (Bandura, Ross & Ross, 1963; Dubner
1973; Levy, McClinton, Rabinowitz & Wolkin, 1974; Walters,
Parke & Cane, 1965). Furthermore, the main purpose of the
present study was to examine the effects of prior learning
on imitation in a vicarious-reinforcement situation.
As it was found, in Experiment 2, that subjects did not
imitate observed reinforced responses when the observation
was Incongruent with their conditioning experience, both
simple imitation and vicarious reinforcement can be ruled
out. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that observed
response-reinforcement relations fail to function as a
discriminative stimulus when said relation is incongruent
with the observer's learning history. Nevertheless, future
studies should include a control condition in which subjects
observe modeling of non-reinforced target response. This
would allow independent assessments of the effects of simple
modeling in contrast to those of observed reinforcement.
The present study contributes to the understanding of
phenomena typically described as "vicarious," by some, by
showing a functional relation between extrinsic, direct
contingencies and the imitative matching behavior of an
observer following observed reinforcement of modeled
responses. The findings suggest that cognitively-oriented
conceptualizations such as those termed 'vicarious' are
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unnecessary for the study of behavior. Furthermore, by
giving the appearance of explanation, such
conceptualizations may discourage research on the proximal
determinants of the matching behavior at issue.
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Table 1
Procedure for Asinment oSuetin xerirent 1 to
Target Color
Baseline Color Preference TreColor Assignmnt
Neither S with a preference Yellow or Green
One S with a preference Non-preferred color
Both Ss prefer the same color Non-preferred color
Both Ss prefer the opposite color Run in Experiment 2
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Table 2
Proportion of Targe espns Scre for Observation and
Conditioningx Group Across Baseline and Test Phases o
Experiment 1
Treatment
Conditioning Observation
n= 16 n= 16 n= 32
Baseline 1= .397 1_= .409 M= .403
SD= .162 SS= .204 D= .182
Phase
n= 16 n= 16 n= 32
Test M= .863 M= .794 1_= .829
SD= .189 SD= .266 SD= .228
n= 32 n= 32
M= .630 M= .602
SD= .176 SD= .235
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Table 3
Procedure for Assignent of ubjcts in -xperment to
Treatment adTarget Color
Assignment
Baseline Pair Subject
Color Preference Group Target Color
Neither S with a preference I or C Yellow or Green
One S with a preference I or C Non-preferred color
Both Ss with the same color C Non-preferred color
preference
Both Ss with the opposite I Non-preferred color
color preference
I = Incongruent
C = Congruent
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Table 4
Desicnanyounterbalancing of Exeriment .
Sample N = 48
Congruent Incongruent
Treatment
N=24 N=24
Treatment ABCA ACBA ABCA ACBA
Order N=12 N=12 N=12 N=12
Target G Y G Y G Y G Y
Color N=5 N=7 N=5 N=7 N=6 N=6 N=6 N=6
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Appendix
Condition and Response Recording Sheet
VICARIOUS REINFORCEMENT STUDY
S#____ Name: ______________ Test Date:
Sex: _____ Age: ______ DOB: _________ Ethn.:
School: Classroom:
Experimenter= Target = Tx Order=
BASELINE TEST
1 11 1 11 21 31 1 11 21 31 1 11
2 12 2 12 22 32 2 12 22 32 2 12
3 13 3 13 23 33 3 13 23 33 3 13
4 14 4 14 24 34 4 14 24 34 4 14
5 15 5 15 25 35 5 15 25 35 5 15
6 16 6 16 26 36 6 16 26 36 6 16
7 17 7 17 27 37 7 17 27 37 7 17
8 18 8 18 28 38 8 18 28 38 8 18
9 19 9 19 29 39 9 19 29 39 9 19
10 20 10 20 30 40 10 20 30 40 10 20
reen Target%= Target%= Target%=
YeLLow=
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